Abstract Boldyreva, Palacio and Warinschi introduced a multiple forking game as an extension of general forking. The notion of (multiple) forking is a useful abstraction from the actual simulation of cryptographic scheme to the adversary in a security reduction, and is achieved through the intermediary of a so-called wrapper algorithm. Multiple forking has turned out to be a useful tool in the security argument of several cryptographic protocols. However, a reduction employing multiple forking incurs a significant degradation of O(q 2n ), where q denotes the upper bound on the underlying random oracle calls and n, the number of forkings. In this work we take a closer look at the reasons for the degradation with a tighter security bound in mind. We nail down the exact set of conditions for success in the multiple forking game. A careful analysis of the cryptographic schemes and corresponding security reduction employing multiple forking leads to the formulation of 'dependence' and 'independence' conditions pertaining to the output of the wrapper in different rounds. Based on the (in)dependence conditions we propose a general framework of multiple forking and a General Multiple Forking Lemma. Leveraging (in)dependence to the full allows us to improve the degradation factor in the multiple forking game by a factor of O(q n ). By implication, the cost of a single forking involving two random oracles (augmented forking) matches that involving a single random oracle (elementary forking). Finally, we study the effect of these observations on the concrete security of existing schemes employing multiple forking. We conclude that by careful design of the protocol (and the wrapper in the security reduction) it is possible to harness our observations to the full extent.
Introduction
Formal security claim of public key cryptographic schemes is typically established through a reduction. The aim is to show that a presumably hard computational problem P polynomial-time reduces to the task of breaking the cryptographic scheme S in a given security model. The security reduction R proceeds through a security game between a hypothetical adversary A (modelled as a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine) and a challenger who simulates the scheme and responds to the adversarial queries according to the rule of the security game. Suppose the adversary A runs in time t and breaks the scheme S with probability at least whereas R takes time t and solves P with probability at least (with t, t , and being functions of a security parameter). Informally speaking, R is tight if t ≈ t and ≈ and non-tight if t t or . If the cryptographic scheme uses a hash function that is modelled as a random function in the reduction then the security claim is said to hold in the 'random oracle' model [4] . In this model the challenger provides the adversary an oracle access to the hash function.
For example, consider the hash-then-sign paradigm of signature construction where a cryptographic hash function is applied on arbitrary length messages to map them to fixed-length digests on which the signature is computed. Pointcheval and Stern [12, 13] introduced the technique of forking to argue the security of a large class of such signature schemes [8, 11, 14] in the random oracle model. In the elementary version of forking, as formulated by Pointcheval and Stern, the simulator runs the signature adversary twice on related inputs in order to solve the underlying hard problem. The Forking Lemma of [13] gives a lower bound of the probability of success in the reduction in terms of the probability of success of the adversary.
Bellare and Neven [1] , however, observed that the "Forking Lemma is something purely probabilistic, not about signatures" and proposed a more abstract version called the General Forking Lemma. The notion of general forking is formulated in terms of randomised algorithms and their outputs, leaving out the concepts of signature scheme as well as random oracles altogether. The abstract problem, as formulated by Bellare and Neven, can be described in terms of two games: (i) A basic game between a 'wrapper' W and an 'adversary' A in which W accepts with a certain probability. (ii) A forking game between G W and A and its associated success condition.
We give a high level overview of how the two games proceed (see the description of general forking in Sect. 2 for further details). The input to W consists of random coins s 1 , . . . , s q and ρ w and the output consists of an index I . The coins are used by W primarily for its interaction with A in the basic game as well as to generate the internal coins for A. In the forking game between G W and A, the basic game is invoked twice. Suppose in the first invocation of W (on s 1 , . . . , s q ; ρ w ) within G W , it outputs an index I ∈ {1, . . . q}. G W next invokes W on an input that is related to the first invocation-that is, (s 1 , . . . , s I −1 , s I , . . . , s q ; ρ w ). The behaviour of A remains identical to the first invocation, right up to the I th query, at which point it diverges (assuming s I = s I ). This is tantamount to forking A at the index I . W outputs an index I in the second invocation and G W is successful if I = I . The problem is to obtain a forking lemma, which relates the success probability of G W in the forking game with the acceptance probability of W in the basic game.
General Forking Lemma allows one to abstract out the probabilistic analysis of forking from the reduction for a specific cryptographic scheme leading to a more modular and easy way to verify proof. In a concrete reduction the wrapper W handles the simulation of the protocol environment to the adversary. Consider, for example, a signature scheme where we want to show that the discrete-log problem in a cyclic group reduces to the task of forging a signature in the random oracle model. The reduction involves showing that the acceptance in the basic game of general forking corresponds to forging a signature while success in the forking game amounts to violating the discrete-log assumption in the underlying group. Here adversary's interaction with a random oracle in the security reduction will correspond to the interactions in the basic game between A and W based on the random coins s 1 , . . . , s q .
Multiple forking The concept of forking was further generalised by Boldyreva et al. [3] leading to a multiple forking game and the associated Multiple Forking Lemma. The immediate motivation behind the new abstraction was to argue the security of a proxy signature scheme that uses more than one hash function (modelled as random oracles). The multiple forking game allows one to mount the so-called nested forking by running the adversary several times on related inputs. In particular, a nested forking involves multiple augmented forkings 1 . The notion of multiple forking retains the modularity advantage of general forking and has been applied in several other security reductions [5, 6, 9] in a more-or-less black-box fashion.
While the wrapper plays the same role in multiple forking as in general forking, there are a few significant changes in its actual structure. As the name suggests, multiple forking game allows the possibility of more than one forking-this adds one level of complexity in the overall structure. Further, the output of the wrapper W now contains a pair of indices (I, J ). The two indices are usually associated to the 'target queries' made to the two random oracles in the reduction employing multiple augmented forking. We illustrate the difference between elementary and augmented forking in Fig. 1 .
Cost of multiple forking
The degradation, i.e., the ratio between the acceptance probability in the basic game and the success probability in the forking game is a measure of the cost incurred in the forking process. Let q denote the upper bound on the number of random oracle queries in the reduction, then the cost of general forking is roughly Fig. 1 Elementary forking (top) versus augmented forking (bottom): elementary forking is successful if the target indices (asterisk) for the two rounds match. Augmented forking involves two random oracles and, hence, to be successful, the additional target indices (star) also should match
O(q) (and evidence suggests that the bound is more or less optimal [15] ). As for multiple forking, the cost according to the original lemma (see Lemma 7 in Appendix) is roughly O(q 2n ), where q is the sum of the upper bound on the queries to the random oracles involved and n is the number of forkings, i.e., the wrapper is called n+1 times. 2 Consequently, the cost of single augmented forking becomes O(q 2 ) even though there is only one forking involved. Thus the application of multiple forking comes with an associated loss of tightness in the corresponding security reductions. The loss affects concrete security of the cryptographic schemes under consideration. 3 This is acknowledged in the concluding statement of [3] where the authors mention that the concrete security bound of their scheme is not particularly tight and they leave the possibility of a tighter reduction as an open question. In fact, for all security reductions that employ the Multiple Forking Lemma [3, 5, 6, 9] , the loss of tightness primarily stems from the loose lower bound of the lemma. Hence it is important to investigate whether and to what extent it is possible to improve the bound in the Multiple Forking Lemma.
Our Contribution
We introduce three new variants of the multiple forking game and incorporate them within a general framework. Our General Multiple Forking Lemma enables significantly tighter security analysis of cryptographic schemes employing multiple forking in their security reduction. The details follow.
A general framework Our primary contribution is to propose a framework for the application of multiple forking leading to a General Multiple Forking Lemma. The framework is arrived at through a detailed analysis consisting of two complementary parts. On one hand we nail down the exact conditions that define the success in multiple forking game and on the other, we revisit the concrete security reductions employing the Multiple Forking Lemma. The analysis leads to two crucial observations: called, respectively, the 'independence' condition (O I ) and the 'dependence' condition (O D ). O I is formulated by a careful abstraction of the exact requirements in the security reductions. In short, it allows the relaxation of success condition in the multiple forking game related to one of the indices returned by the wrapper W across two different pairs of invocations. (We pair two consecutive invocations of W into a single logical unit of wrapper F W , where 'F' refers to basic forking). O D , on the other hand, has its root in the ordering of two different hash function calls that is actually observed in cryptographic protocols.
Our framework captures the original multiple-forking game as well as the observations O I and O D (separately and together) leading to four different versions of the lemma. We prove the new versions of the lemma. Naturally, the analysis becomes more involved as we incorporate the above two conditions-the most involved case occurs when one captures both the observations O I and O D (O {I,D} , in short). We draw from existing techniques [1, 3] as well as introduce some new optimisation to significantly improve upon the existing bound. To be exact, the degradation reduces from O(q 2n ) to O(q n ) when both the observations are incorporated in the analysis (see Table 3 for a summary). Informally speaking, we have the following result:
Result (see Lemma 3) Let acc be the acceptance probability of wrapper W, then it is possible to achieve multiple forking with a success probability of Ω(acc n+1 /q n ).
Corollary (see Claim 1, Remark 3) As in the case of an elementary forking, a single augmented forking incurs a degradation of O(q)
, where degradation is the ratio between the acceptance probability in the basic game and the acceptance probability in the forking game.
Recall that the general forking game of [1] captures a single elementary forking with a degradation of O(q). Multiple forking with O {I,D} , according to the above corollary, seems to be the best possible generalisation of general forking.
Effect on security reductions Finally, we study the applicability of our observations on the security of the existing schemes that employ multiple forking [3, 6, 9] . We conclude that by careful design of the protocol (or, for that matter, by easily modifying existing protocols) it is possible to harness both the observations O I and O D to the full extent. Thus, we end up with the following corollary of our main result.
Corollary (see Table 1 ) In all the known applications of Multiple-Forking Lemma, the associated degradation in the security reduction improves by a factor of O(q n ) under the same (hardness) assumptions.
It is thus conceivable that future applications of multiple forking in security reduction of cryptographic schemes will benefit from our improved analysis.
Notation and Organisation
General notation We adopt the notation commonly used in the literature. Sets are denoted using the blackboard font (e.g., S, Z); distributions on these sets using Here q denotes the upper bound on the respective hash oracle queries; is the advantage that the adversary has in the respective protocols . . . , y n ). Sometimes the random coins for this algorithm are given explicitly as an input. This is distinguished from the normal input using a semi-colon, e.g., y ← A(x; ρ). Finally, a ? = b returns 1 if a = b, and 0 otherwise.
Random coins
We fix some conventions with regard to the coins involved in the forking algorithm. The internal coins (denoted by ρ w ) for the wrapper algorithm W is assumed to be drawn from a set R (not to be confused with the set of real numbers). On the other hand, the random coins pertaining to the random oracle(s) that W simulates is denoted by S := {s 1 , . . . , s q } with the round indicated in the superscript, e.g. S 0 := {s 0 1 , . . . , s 0 q }; these are sampled uniformity at random, and independently from S. For convenience, we use the convention in Table 2 to split up S. Hence, {S i− , S i+ } indicates S split up into two at the index i, whereas {S j− , S ji , S i+ } indicates S split into three, at indices j and i respectively.
Random oracles
The symbol < is used to order the hash function calls; e.g., for hash functions H and G, H(x) < G(y) indicates that the call H(x) precedes the call G(y)-the convention applies to random oracles as well. More generally, H < G indicates that the target H-call precedes the target G-call. In discussions involving the forking algorithms, Q i j denotes the j th random oracle query in round i of simulation.
Organisation We take a closer look at multiple forking in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3, we give a general framework and improved analysis of the Multiple Forking Lemma, while in Sect. 4 we apply the improvements to the security analysis of existing schemes employing the lemma. Finally, we end with the concluding remarks in Sect. 5. As for the appendix, we reproduce the original multiple forking game in "(Original) MultipleForking Algorithm" section of Appendix. We give the deferred analyses of Multiple Forking Lemma with O I and O D (separately) in "Harnessing (In)Dependence" section of Appendix. The construction of the schemes referred to in the paper is given in "Constructions" section of Appendix; the deferred security arguments are in "Security Arguments" section of Appendix.
Multiple-Forking: A Closer Look
We first recall the games associated with general and multiple forking and the associated lemmas.
General Forking Fix q ∈ Z + and a set S such that |S| ≥ 2. Let W be a randomised algorithm that on input a string x and elements S ∈ S q returns a pair (I, σ ) consisting of an integer 0 ≤ I ≤ q and a string σ . The forking game G W associated to W is defined as Algorithm 1 below.
Algorithm 1 G W (x)
Pick coins ρ w for W at random
) Let X be a randomised algorithm that takes no input and returns a string. Let
Multiple-Forking Game Fix q ∈ Z + and a set S such that |S| ≥ 2. Let W be a randomised algorithm that on input a string x and elements S ∈ S q returns a triple (I, J, σ ) consisting of two integers 0 ≤ J < I ≤ q and a string σ . Let n ≥ 1 be an odd integer. Multiple forking game M W,n associated to W and n is defined in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 M W,n (x)
Remark 1
We have slightly revised the multiple forking game to fix a subtle (but minor in effect) logical flaw in the original version (reproduced in "(Original) MultipleForking Algorithm" section of Appendix). For the convenience of the readers we have boxed the modification in Algorithm 2, the check in the original version was for (s k
). However, this is not sufficient for some of the reduction algorithms that use the original M W,n . For example, consider the application of M W,5 in the security argument of the zero knowledge protocol [6] . At the end of the simulation,
, and the reduction, subsequently, finds the solution to the discrete-log problem (DLP) by computing
where
and z 3 := s 4 J 0 in the original M W,5 . Thus, for a correct solution of DLP, the reduction requires to compute (z 1 −z 2 ) −1 and (z 1 −z 3 ) −1 . The authors [6] assert " [a] ccording to the probing strategy z 1 , z 2 , z 3 are all distinct". However, as per the original proposition, M W,5 of [3] will only ensure that z 2 = z 1 and z 3 = z 2 but not necessarily z 1 = z 3 . Hence, the probing strategy does not guarantee that all the z i s are distinct and the reduction may fail even though the forking game returns success. Clearly, the fault lies in the condition ¬D k within the while loop of original description of multiple forking, which checks for equality only with the round just preceding it and comes into the picture for M W,n for n ≥ 5. A simple fix is to introduce pairwise check for equality, i.e., by changing the proposition from (s k
. Note that n is a parameter in M W,n and typically a small odd integer. So the change has a minor impact on the probability bound given in the original lemma and is captured in the revised version given below.
Lemma 2 (Revised Multiple-Forking Lemma) Let X be a randomised algorithm that takes no input and returns a string. Let
Tightness: An Intuitive Picture
Each run of M W,n consists of n + 1 runs of the corresponding wrapper W (called round 0 to round n), for some odd n. Informally speaking, M W,n is successful provided W is successful in each of the n + 1 rounds and some additional conditions are satisfied. We call these set of conditions
Let S be the event that all the conditions in A 0 are satisfied, i.e.,
What the lemma gives us is a lower bound of the probability of this event.
The logical wrapper F W We have introduced some conceptual changes in the description of M W,n based on a simple but crucial observation that the wrapper algorithm W is always invoked in pairs. Note that, the conditions C k and D k above also pertain to a pair of invocations. Two consecutive invocations of W (i.e., round k and round k+1, for even k ≥ 0) have been clubbed together so that it can be visualised (see Fig. 2 ) as the invocation of a single logical unit F W . Accordingly, multiple forking game Intuitively, a single invocation of F W is similar to the general forking game of [1] as the objective of both is to launch an 'elementary' oracle replay attack. The differences from general forking are in place to facilitate nested forking. Restructuring of the multiple forking game using the logical wrapper F W -coupled with the necessary reformulation of the success conditions-provide us the right handle for an improved analysis of its probability of success (mfrk). It also leads to a more modular description of multiple forking game (see Algorithm 4) .
The Conditions Among the set of conditions A 0 , B is relatively easy to deal with as it is checked only at the beginning and contributes a factor of acc in the final expression for mfrk. So let's look at the effect of the other conditions. Consider the event
Clearly, the check for equality
is predominant in the final expression for mfrk (the equality holds only with a probability of 1/q 2 ). On the other hand, (s
) is almost always true 4 . It's a similar case for the event
holds only with a probability of 1/q 2 . Hence, the probability of the events C and D is dominated respectively by
Consequently, the degradation in the original lemma stems, predominantly, from what we term as the 'core' event
formed by combining the two expressions in (5) . Each of the n checks for equality in the condition contributes (roughly) a factor of O(q 2 ), resulting in an overall degradation of O(q 2n ). That's the intuitive reason of the loose lower bound one gets for mfrk.
Road-Map to a Better Analysis
Clearly, to achieve a tighter bound for mfrk, one needs to revisit the conditions associated with the number of checks involved in the success event S 0,c . In order to better understand the exact role of these conditions, we revisit the concrete protocols and their security reduction that employ the lemma [3, 6, 9] . Our analysis leads to the following observations-called, respectively, the independence and the dependence conditions. 
except with a negligible probability). 5
Remark 2 The concrete motivation for the above two observations will become clear when we revisit the actual security argument of the existing schemes in Sect. 4. O I is based on a precise analysis of what is actually required from the process of (multiple) forking in the security argument of [3, 6, 9] . In particular, all known applications of multiple forking satisfies O I . The condition O D finds its root in the more concrete notion of ordering the evaluation of hash functions. Suppose a cryptographic scheme uses two hash functions H 1 and H 2 in such a way that first H 1 is called and then its output is used to form the input to H 2 . In such cases we say that the H 2 -call is binded to the H 1 -call. The proxy signature scheme of Boldyreva et al. [3] is one example where such binding exists (see Sect. 4.1 for further details). The notion of binding is abstracted out as index binding (see Definition 2) , and eventually leads to index dependence (see Claim 4) . As in the case of O I , we'll show that either O D is naturally satisfied [6] or one can easily modify existing construction [9] to suit the condition (see Sects. 4.4 and 4.3.1 respectively). The abstraction is required in the context of forking game due to the absence of the notion of hash function (or random oracles).
The consequences Based on O I , the condition in (5) can be relaxed to:
and, by implication, the core event in (6) is relaxed to
Hence, the number of overall checks is reduced from 2n to (2·(n +1)/2+(n −1)/2) = (3n + 1)/2 and the complexity of launching a nested forking is brought down to O(q (3n+1)/2 ). A similar analysis shows that based on only O D (and, assuming 'fulldependency' for simplicity), the core event in (6) relaxes to
In this case the number of overall checks is reduced from 2n to (3n − 1)/2 and the complexity to O(q (3n−1)/2 ). Interestingly, O I and O D can be employed in conjunction. This leads to the core event being further simplified to
Observe that the number of checks is now reduced to n. Thus the complexity of launching a nested forking is reduced from O(q 2n ) to O(q n ).
A General Framework
In this section, we first formally describe the logical wrapper F W and the notion of index dependence. This is followed by a general framework of the multiple forking game which captures the spectrum of conditions described in the previous section.
Finally we analyse the effects of these changes on the Multiple Forking Lemma.
Here the wrapper W is a randomised algorithm that on input a string x ∈ X and elements S ∈ S q returns a triple (I, J, σ ) consisting of two integers 0 ≤ I, J ≤ q and a string σ .
Definition 1 (Index Dependence) Consider the output of the wrapper
More specifically, J is said to be fully-dependent on I if η = 1, i.e. (I = I ) ⇒ (J = J ). But for most applications, it suffices that J be η-dependent on I for some η which is asymptotically close to 1.
General Multiple-Forking
We noted in the previous section that one ends up with four different sets of 'core' conditions S 0,c through S 3,c depending on whether (or not) the observations O I and O D are taken into account (whereas, the 'non-core' conditions remained the same for all the four cases). In order to capture this, we introduce an extra level of abstraction-we describe a general framework for multiple forking with an associated set of conditions A, where the game is described in terms of the logical wrapper F W . The resulting set of conditions, A 0 through A 3 , (along with the associated degradation) are given in Table 3 .
General Multiple-Forking Fix q ∈ Z + and a set S such that |S| ≥ 2, and let n ≥ 1 be an odd integer. Let F W be as described in Algorithm 3. In addition, let A denote the set of conditions, and be of the form {B, C, D} with C := C 0 , C 2 , . . . , C n−1 and D := D 2 , D 4 , . . . , D n−1 . The multiple forking game N A,F W ,n associated to A, F W and n is defined as Algorithm 4 below.
Algorithm 4 N A,F W ,n (x)
Pick coins ρ w for W at random; set J 0 := 0
Harnessing (In)Dependence
Here we provide a detailed analysis of multiple forking when both O I and O D are satisfied, i.e., N A 3 ,F W ,n with η-dependence. As expected, the analysis of this case turns out to be the most involved and in a sense subsumes the analysis of the other two cases: N A 1 ,F W ,n and N A 2 ,F W ,n with η-dependence (see Lemma 8 and Lemma 9 in Appendix for the last two).
Lemma 3 (Multiple-Forking Lemma with Index (In)Dependence) Let X be a probability distribution on a set X. Let 
Here C k is expressed in terms of the output of the logical wrapper F W in the kth invocation. Note that we have ignored the (common) n factor in the degradation and assumed full-dependence
On the assumption that J is η-dependent on I , mfrk 3 ≥ frk frk
The main hurdle in proving the bounds lies in exploiting the leverage offered by O I and O D , in the probability analysis. As it turns out, O D is much harder to integrate-we have to appeal to the underlying sets (i.e. the source of randomness) in the multiple forking game. On the other hand, the analysis of O I is in some sense similar to the analysis of the original analysis in [3] . Naturally, the simultaneous analysis of O I and O D is a 'hybrid' of the above two. We make use of the following two inequalities.
Lemma 4 (Jensen's and Hölder's inequalities) Let f be a convex function and X be a real-valued random variable. Then by Jensen's inequality
Let q ∈ Z + , 1 ≤ n < ∞ and x 1 , . . . , x q ≥ 0 be real numbers. Then by Hölder's inequality 6
Proof (of Lemma 3.) For a fixed string x ∈ X, let
For ease of notation, we further break the event C k (resp. D k ) into two subevents C k,c and C k,s (resp. D k,c and D k,s ) as shown below.
That is, with the probabilities calculated over the coin tosses of N A 3 ,F W ,n , it follows that mfrk 3 (x) = P(S). The task of bounding this probability is accomplished through three claims (Claim 1 through Claim 3). The object at the centre of Claim 1 is the logical unit F W . With index dependence, the behaviour of F W is similar to the general forking algorithm G W of Bellare and Neven [1] . Claim 1 bounds the probability of success of F W , denoted by frk(x), in terms of acc(x). The bound on frk(x) is used in Claim 2 and Claim 3 to bound mfrk 3 (x) . Without loss of generality, we consider the first invocation of F W in the multiple forking game.
Proof With the probability taken over the coin tosses in F W , it follows that frk(x) = P B ∧ C 0 = P(B ∧ C 0,c ∧ C 0,s ) (using subevents given in (13))
6 Although, the result is a corollary to a more general Let's denote the two parts of the above expression by frk c (x) and frk s (x) respectively.
The first part of (14), on the other hand, forms the core probability for F W . In order to analyse it, we define a series of random variables
. . , q}, as follows.
given explicity as input and the probability is over the space S q−i+1 . Using W i , frk c (x) can be expressed as follows.
In the derivation step of ( * ) above, the expectation is over uniform distribution on the domain of W i . By substituting (15) and (16) in (14), we get
The fundamental difference between the above argument and the proof of General Forking Lemma in [1] is the involvement of the additional index J . The analysis proceeds as in [1] because we utilize η-dependence. Without this assumption, proving Claim 1 would require defining a random variable that takes both the indices into consideration (this is indeed the case in the proof of Lemma 8).
Remark 3
The remaining two claims require a series of random variables F j , for 1 ≤ j ≤ q, that capture a single invocation of F W with (ρ w , S j− ) given explicitly as input.
where the probability is over the space S q− j+1 ×S q from which the rest of the random coins (i.e., S j+ , S ) are chosen from. 7 Next, our aim is to bound mfrk 3 (x) in terms of F j (Claim 2), and then bound F j in terms of frk(x) (Claim 3).
Claim 2
Proof The first step is to separate the core subevents out of the event S as shown below. 7 Note that it is possible to define F j in this way because we take into account the independence condition O I across two different runs of F W . Without this assumption, the analysis would require a random variable that takes both the indices into consideration (as we do later in the proof of Lemma 9 using a random variable F i, j ).
We denote the first part of (17) by mfrk 3,c (x) and the second part by mfrk 3,s (x) and analyse them separately.
In the above expression, G k denotes the event 0) ). Using the random variable F j , and expectation taken over uniform distribution on its domain, Eq. (18) can be rewritten as
The last two inequalities are a consequence of Lemma 4. Using a similar line of approach 8 as above, it is possible to bound mfrk 3,s too in terms of F j . 8 The steps are given below. What remains is to relate Claim 1 and Claim 2 by establishing
Proof From the definition of the random variable F j , it follows that
by definition is frk(x).
On putting all the three claims together, we get
Finally, taking the expectation over x $ ← − X , yields
establishing Lemma 3. Note that on assuming |S| 1, one gets mfrk 3 ≈ acc n+1 /q n .
Revisiting the Security Argument of Existing Schemes
We now take a closer look at the cryptographic schemes that employ multiple forking in their security argument. Our primary objective is to examine the applicability of the observations O I and O D . We use the proxy signature scheme of Boldyreva et al. (BPW-PSS) [3] to motivate how both O I and O D can be applied in the security argument. The conclusion is that the notion of 'binding'-which we elaborate on in Sect. 4.1-is key to achieving index dependence. Next, in Sect. 4.3, we observe that for the identity-based signature scheme of Galindo and Garcia (GG-IBS) [9] the binding is not in place-therefore, we introduce it, and due to the resulting index dependence we get a tighter reduction. Finally, in Sect. 4.4, we discuss the effect on zero-knowledge protocol of Chow et al. (CMW-ZKP) [6] .
Binding
The notion of index binding can be best appreciated through a concrete example. Consider the construction of BPW-PSS scheme (see Fig. 7 of Appendix). The proxy signature scheme uses three hash functions: G, R and H which are called by the different algorithms in a certain order. Here we mainly focus on the generation of proxy signature. Observe that Delegation uses G for producing proxy certificates, and R for generating proxy secret keys while H is used in Proxy Signing. The proxy signature is computed using the proxy secret key which, in turn, is computed using the proxy certificate. Hence, to generate a proxy signature the hash function calls must follow a logical order: G < R < H (here < denotes 'followed by'). Let's now take a look at the structure of hash function calls:
The critical point is to observe the binding between the hash functions: input of R contains c which is the output of G, whereas input of H contains r which is the output of R. Put differently, input to R has all information about output of G, and the input to H has all the information about the output of R. Consequently, to produce a proxy signature, one has to call the hash functions in the order: G < R < H (which is also the logical order). In other words, the logical order has been explicitly imposed as the only viable order.
Index Binding Next, consider the security reduction for BPW-PSS where the hash functions are modelled as random oracles. The aforesaid order among the hash functions naturally translates into an order among the corresponding random oracle calls. Hence, to forge a proxy signature, an adversary has to (except, with a negligible probability of guessing) make the random oracle queries in the order G < R < H. In other words, if K , J and I are the indices that refer to the target G, R and H random oracle queries corresponding to the forgery, then it follows that (1 ≤ K < J < I ≤ q). This translates into the following abstraction (restricted to two indices) of the notion of binding in terms of the wrapper W.
Definition 2 (Index Binding) Let (I, J, σ )
$ ← − W(S), with S $ ← − S. We say that the index I is bound to index J if whenever 1 ≤ J < I ≤ q, the input to Q I included the output of Q J . Now, consider a second round of simulation of the adversary initiated by a forking at I (corresponding to the successful target H-query). Suppose the adversary is successful in the second round and, in addition, the target H-index for the second round matches with the first (i.e., I = I ). It is not difficult to see that, due to binding, the R and G target indices for the two rounds also have to match (except, with a negligible probability). Hence, (I = I ) implies (J = J ) and (K = K )-in other words, for a properly designed wrapper, index binding will lead to index dependence. We have the following claim for the hash functions G and R-a similar argument holds for R and H. Fig. 3 Violation of dependence in queries to random oracles within the logical wrapper
Claim 4 (Binding induces dependence in BPW-PSS) Consider the random oracle calls corresponding to hash functions G and R in BPW-PSS security reduction employing multiple forking. Let q G denote the upper bound on the number of queries to the random oracle G; let n g denote the cardinality of range of G. The binding of G to R (i.e. the output of G is a function of input to R) induces dependence with
Proof (sketch) Without loss of generality, consider the first invocation of the logical wrapper F W in the corresponding multiple forking game. Let J and I (resp. J and I ) refer to the target indices for G and R in round 0 (resp. round 1). By construction of the scheme and design of the wrapper, we know that index binding holds. Suppose for contradiction that index dependence does not: that is (I = I ) but (J = J ). It is not difficult to see that this can happen only in the scenario illustrated in Fig. 3 . That is, i) the adversary made a query Q J * (to the random oracle G) that is different from Q J , the target G-query for the round 0 of simulation; and ii) Q J * was also responded to with s J (the simulator's response to Q J ). However, this is tantamount to a collision on the random function corresponding to the oracle G, and according to the birthday bound, can happen with probability at most q G (q G − 1)/n g .
Note that a logical order among the hash functions in a cryptographic scheme does not necessarily translate to binding between them. A natural way to induce binding between two hash functions H 1 and H 2 is through the technique used in BPW-PSS: including the output of H 1 in the input to H 2 . Such binding is not present in the original GG-IBS whereas binding for the CMW-ZKP does follow from the logical order. We elaborate on this point further in subsequent sections.
The Boldyreva-Palacio-Warinschi Proxy Signature Scheme
We refer the reader to [3] for the definition of proxy signature and the original security argument of BPW-PSS-the construction is reproduced in "The Boldyreva-PalacioWarinschi Proxy Signature Scheme" section of Appendix. The extremely technical and long security argument of [3] consists of five reductions B through F, with the associated wrappers Y, Z, U, V and W respectively-DLP is reduced to breaking the scheme in each of them. The reductions C, D and F use multiple forking, whereas, the reductions B and E use general forking. Some features of the relevant reductions C, D and F are summarised in Table 4 . 
q G , q R and q H denote the upper bound on the respective hash oracle queries
Inherent binding and wrapper design
We have already pointed out the inherent binding of the hash functions used in BPW-PSS. This, along with a careful design of the wrappers, ensures that the Multiple Forking Lemma is applied properly. An integral part in the design of wrappers is the explicit check for the logical order among the target random oracle queries. If the order is violated, the wrapper returns I = 0. For example, consider the reduction C and the associated wrapper Z from [3] . The check ensures that the indices J and I (that the wrapper returns) always correspond to the target query for the random oracles R and H respectively. Moreover, due to dependence, the adversary is bound (except with a negligible probability of guessing) to make the target oracle queries in the logical order, i.e. R < H. These two factors ensure that the reduction C will end up with a correct solution to the DLP whenever the multiple forking game is successful. The same strategy has been followed meticulously in the construction of D and F as well. So the notion of index dependence is used, albeit implicitly, in the security argument of BPW-PSS. However, when we come to the forking games that correspond to this particular scheme, neither the notion of index dependence nor that of independence is considered in the analysis.
Improved Security Argument
The new security argument takes advantage of both the observations O I and O D . We have already seen that O D is applicable due to the existing binding. As for O I , we again consider the case of reduction C and its wrapper Z due to their relative simplicity-a similar argument works for reductions D and F as well. Let (V, z) be the forged proxy signature produced by the adversary. The wrapper Z is designed to output index I (resp. J ) corresponding to the H-oracle (resp. R-oracle) query related to the forged signature. It also outputs σ := (z, h, r ) and for a valid forgery the congruence z = v + (r α + y + c log g pk d )h holds in Z p . 9 C uses the forking game N A 0 ,F Z ,3 to secure a set of four such tuples (see Fig. 4 
Here, σ andσ (resp.σ andσ ) correspond to the same round of the logical wrapperhence,r = r andṙ =r . Also note that both V = g v and r are contained in the input to the H query at index I . What we have now is a system of four congruences in four (effective) unknowns {α, (y + c log g pk i ), v,v} with α being the solution to the DLP. The forgeries σ andσ (resp.σ andσ ) can be clubbed together as they constitute the output of the logical wrapper F Z . The solution α of DLP is obtained as
Note that a part of the derivation is elimination of v from (z,ẑ) andv from (z,ż) in (20). What is necessary at this point is that the I indices must match within F Z . The solution is not affected by the value of I in the second invocation of F Z . In other words, eliminating v from (z,ẑ) is not affected by the pair (z,ż) and vice versa. Hence, from the point of view of the reduction, it doesn't make any difference whether we relax the condition to accommodate independence-the system of congruences one ends up with is exactly the same as in (20).
To sum it up, in order to harness both O I and O D , the only change in the security argument of [3] is to use general multiple forking (with Lemma 3) instead of the original one from [3] . The resulting changes are summarised in Table 4 .
The Galindo-Garcia Identity-Based Signature
The original construction from [9] is reproduced in Fig. 8 of Appendix, and we refer the reader to [2] for the definition and security model of identity-based signature (IBS). Two hash functions are used in the construction: H and G (both map arbitrary length strings to Z * p ). The structure of hash function calls is given below:
H is used to generate the user secret key which, in turn, is required to sign on a message (using G). Hence H < G constitutes the logical order for the hash functions. However, no binding is in place by construction. The absence of binding is precisely the reason for the 'incompleteness' of the original security argument that was pointed out in [5] .
The incompleteness was addressed in [5] by using a two-reduction strategy-give separate reductions for each of the orders of the target H and G calls.
Modified Galindo-Garcia IBS
A better alternative to the two-reduction fix is to enforce the logical order on the adversary by binding the G-oracle to the H-oracle. A modified GG-IBS with the aforesaid binding is given in Fig. 9 of Appendix. In short, the structure of the hash function call to G is changed to the following:
Once the binding is in place, the adversary (except with a negligible probability) is bound to make the target oracle queries in the logical order. In addition, through an argument similar to that of BPW-PSS, one can show that index independence also follows. Accordingly, the security argument for the modified GG-IBS consists of two reductions R 1 and R 3 . The core of these reductions remains the same as in R 1 and R 3 respectively of [5] . The only major change is the use of multiple forking game N A 3 ,F W ,n (with Lemma 3) in R 3 instead of the original multiple forking in R 3 . For the sake of completeness, we give a detailed description of R 3 (including the wrapper) in "Modified Galindo-Garcia IBS" section of Appendix. The overall effect is summarised in Table 5 .
The Chow-Ma-Weng Zero-Knowledge Protocol
Chaum and Pederson devised a zero-knowledge protocol for proving the equality of two discrete logarithms [7] . The protocol due to Chow et al. [6] improves on that of Chaum and Pederson by increasing efficiency and, also, by including provision for simultaneous checking of n ≥ 2 discrete logarithms. In contrast to the signature schemes discussed above, here the Multiple Forking Lemma is applied to a commitment-challenge round (and a random oracle). 
q G and q H denote the upper bound on the respective hash oracle queries, whereas, q ε denotes upper bound on the extract queries. We have assumed η to be asymptotically (in security parameter) close to 1
Fig. 5
The Chow-Ma-Weng argument for the statement log g y 1 = log g y 2
The protocol We confine ourselves to the basic protocol (n = 2) which is reproduced in Fig. 5 -our argument can be easily extended for arbitrary values of n. The protocol consists of three rounds of interaction between a prover P and a verifier V: commitment, challenge and response. Two objects are relevant in the context of (multiple) forking: the hash function H and the interactive commitment-challenge round, denoted by C.
Original Security Argument
The security requirements for the protocol include soundness, completeness and (honest-verifier) zero-knowledge [10] . For CMW-ZKP, the Multiple Forking Lemma is used to establish soundness and we restrict our attention to it. But before commenting on their result, we briefly discuss how the forking game applies to the current setting.
Suppose there exists an adversary who in the role of prover breaks the soundness property of the zero-knowledge protocol by producing a cheating transcript. The simulator rewinds the adversary to the point of its commitment, say v, and runs again with a fresh challenge value. The verifier, thus, obtains different cheating transcripts on the same commitment but different challenges (and proceeds to solve some hard problem).
The wrapper simulates the verifier in the zero-knowledge setting and uses its own randomness to send protocol messages (i.e. challenges) as well as to answer the random oracle queries. Note that for a proper application of the Multiple Forking Lemma, it is necessary that the wrapper must use fresh randomness for the protocol message in each forked execution of the simulation. Otherwise, the bound arrived at in the forking lemma no longer holds.
Soundness Soundness property of CMW-ZKP is based on the hardness of DLP: the reduction, denoted by B, uses the (original) multiple forking game N A 0 ,F W ,5 to launch a nested forking involving H and C. Recall that we have already discussed in Remark 1 how to use the output of N A 0 ,F W ,5 to solve the given DLP. The construction of the wrapper W was not provided in [6] . For the sake of completeness, we describe the wrapper in "The Chow-Ma-Weng Zero-Knowledge Protocol" section of Appendix.
Lemma 5 (Soundness, Lemma 4 in [6]) In the random-oracle model (the hash function H will be modelled as a random oracle), if there exists an adversary A that can
-break the soundness of the CMW protocol (i.e. V accepts but log g y 1 = log g y 2 ), there exists an algorithm B which can -solve the DLP with
where q H is the number of random oracle query made by A and q C is the number of interactions between A and B. 10
A Case for (In)Dependence
We now elaborate on the aspects of dependency and independence in the context of CMW protocol.
Recall that the commitment v is of the form (g z h) k , where z := H(y 1 , y 2 ). By construction, the prover has to compute z before making the commitment and the verifier returns the challenge c only after receiving the commitment. Hence the logical order of H < C-however, this also leads to a natural binding between C and H. Now consider the simulation of the protocol, in particular, the first invocation of F W . At the end of round 0, the adversary produces a cheating transcript . If we follow the success conditions of the original forking game, then this particular forking is successful with probability roughly 1/q 2 because the cheating transcript has to be on the same commitment v 1 1 (i.e. I 1 = I 0 ) and, also, on the same H-oracle output z 1 (i.e. J 1 = J 0 ).
However, it is easy to observe that, due to the natural binding between C and H discussed above, an adversary cheating on the commitment v 1 1 at the end of round 1 has to (except, with a negligible probability of guessing c 1 2 ) cheat using the H-oracle output z 1 . In other words, the adversary commits to z 1 indirectly through v 1 1 -hence, (I 1 = I 0 ) implies (J 1 = J 0 ). The same argument holds for the other two invocations of F W as well.
Condition O I : The line of argument is basically similar to the one adopted for the BPW-PSS. Consider the first invocation of F W in the simulation. For the reduction to successfully solve the DLP, the adversary, over these two rounds, has to produce two cheating transcripts on the same commitment (i.e. I 1 = I 0 ). This applies to the rounds round k and round k+1, for k = 2 and k = 4 as well. However, it is not required that the I indices should match across these rounds (i.e. (I 4 = I 2 = I 0 )). To see this, consider the effect of relaxing the condition on the simulation which is shown in Fig. 6 .
Even though the I indices across F W do not match (I 0 , I 2 and I 4 ), the set of cheating transcripts that the reduction obtains is still of the same form-that is,
The technique used to solve the DLP dis-cussed in Remark 1 (see (2)) still works. Hence, it suffices that I for the cheating transcripts within the two rounds of a particular invocation of F W match, but not necessarily across the different invocations.
Improved Argument
The multiple forking in the original security argument can be replaced with the general multiple forking game N 
where q H is the number of random oracle query made by A, while q C is the number of interactions between A and B.
Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a general framework for the application of the Multiple Forking Lemma. The framework and the corresponding forking game is derived based on a careful analysis of the original Multiple Forking Lemma and its application in the security argument of various schemes. We prove that the conditions based on the notions of (in)dependence significantly improve upon the bound of the original lemma. We also show that all known instances of the application of the original Multiple Forking Lemma satisfy the (in)dependence conditions and hence benefit from our improved bound. Whether the new bounds in the security analysis are optimal or can be improved further will be an interesting open question from a theoretical perspective.
Harnessing (In)Dependence
Multiple-Forking with Index Independence Lemma 8 (Multiple-Forking Lemma with Index Independence) Let X be a probability distribution on a set X. Let
Proof The analysis, especially its logical flow, is quite similar to the original analysis in [3] . Since no dependence is assumed we can carry out the analysis without directly using the logical wrapper. We stick to the conventions adopted in Sect. 3.2. For a fixed string x ∈ X, let
Recall the condition-set A 1 from Table 3 . For ease of notation, we further break the event C k (resp. D k ) into two subevents C k,c and C k,s (resp. D k,c and D k,s ) as follows:
With the probabilities calculated over the randomness used in the forking game, it follows that mfrk 1 (x) = P(S) where
The first step in calculating the probability is to separate the core subevents out of the event S. This is accomplished as follows.
(by the subevents in (25))
It can be shown that the second part of (26) equals (n + 1)(n + 3)acc(x)/8|S| by following the analysis in (19), whereas the first part constitutes the core event, and is denoted by mfrk 1,c (x) . The event corresponding to mfrk 1,c (x) is closely related to the event given in (7) . The next step is to show that
The intermediate steps to achieving it follow.
In the above expression, G k denotes the event
Let's focus on the probability part of (28) (conditioned on G k ).
At this point, we define a series of random variables W : S j−i+1 → [0, 1], for each i, j ∈ {1, . . . , q}, ρ w ∈ R and S j− ∈ S j−1 as follows.
W captures a single invocation of the wrapper W but with the internal randomness ρ w and the random coins S j− fixed. Using W, and taking expectation over uniform distribution on its domain, (29) can be rewritten as
Next, we define a random variable W j :
Hence, on representing (30) in terms of the random variable W j , we get
Substituting the above expression, further, in (28) yields
(by Lemma 4)
That completes the analysis of the core event and establishes our initial claim in (27). On combining the two parts of the equation (26), we get
With expectation taken over
hence, proving the lemma. On assuming |S| 1, one gets mfrk 1 ≈ acc n+1 /q (3n+1)/2 .
Multiple-Forking with Index Dependence
Lemma 9 (Multiple-Forking Lemma with Index Dependence) Let X be a probability distribution on a set X. Let
On the assumption that J is η-dependent on I , mfrk 2 ≥ frk frk
Proof For a fixed string x ∈ X, let
Recall the condition-set A 2 from Table 3 -we separate the event D k into the core and non-core events given below.
With the probability calculated over the randomness of the general forking game, it follows that mfrk 2 (x) = P(S), where
We use three claims: Claim 1 (which we re-use from Sect. 3.2), Claim 5 and Claim 6 to achieve this. In order to establish Claim 5 and Claim 6 we define a random vari-
Briefly, our aim is to bound mfrk 2 (x) in terms of F i, j (Claim 5) and bound F i, j in terms of frk(x) (Claim 6).
Claim 5
Proof We separate out the subevents of the event S as shown below.
(by the subevents given in (32))
We denote the first part of (33) by mfrk 2,c (x) and the second part by mfrk 2,s (x) and analyse them separately.
. Using the random variable F i, j , (34) can be rewritten as
Using a similar line of approach (as in (34) and (35)), it is possible to establish that
Substituting the value of mfrk 2,c (x) from (35) and mfrk 2,s (x) from (36) in (33), yields the bound in Claim 5.
What remains is to relate Claim 1 and Claim 5
by definition is frk(x).
Finally, taking the expectation over x
establishing Lemma 9. We conclude with the comment that on assuming |S| 1, one gets mfrk 2 ≈ acc n+1 /q (3n−1)/2 .
Constructions
The Boldyreva-Palacio-Warinschi Proxy Signature Scheme 
Galindo Garcia IBS: Original and Modified
The construction in Fig. 9 is the same as in Fig. 8 except for the structure of the hash functions-we have introduced a binding between H and G (through d := G(m, A, c) where c := H(id, R)). Note that the binding that we introduced is more refined than the one suggested in Sect. 4.3.1 (i.e., d := G(id A m c) where c := H(R id)) (see Fig. 9 ).
Security Arguments
Modified Galindo-Garcia IBS E: A makes at least one signature query onîd andR was returned by the simulator as part of the output to a signature query onîd. E: Either A does not make any signature queries onîd orR was never returned by the simulator as part of the output to a signature query onîd.
In the event E we give a reduction R 1 , whereas in the eventĒ, we give R 3 . Apart from the need of a wrapper, R 1 is similar to the reduction R 1 given in [5] . R 3 , on the other we confine the security argument to the details of reduction R 3 .
Reduction R 3
Let Δ := (G, p, g, g α ) be the given DLP instance. The reduction involves invoking the forking game N A 3 ,F W ,3 on the wrapper W as shown in Algorithm 6. As a result, it obtains a set of four congruences in four unknowns and solves for α. It can be verified that R 3 indeed returns the correct solution to the DLP instance (see full version of [5] for details). 
The Wrapper
Suppose that q := q H + q G and S := Z p . Wrapper W takes as input the master public key mpk and s 1 , . . . , s q , and returns a triple (I, J, σ ) where J and I are integers that refer to the target H and G query respectively and σ is the side-output. In order to track the index of the current random oracle query, W maintains a counter , initially set to 1. It also maintains a table L H (resp. L G ) to manage the random oracle H (resp. G). W initiates the simulation of the protocol environment by passing mpk as the challenge master public key to the adversary A. The queries by A are handled as per the following specifications. 
